



Joint Discussion Paper 
Series in Economics 
by the Universities of 
Aachen · Gießen · Göttingen 







Christian M. Bender and Georg Götz    
 
 
Coexistence of Service- and Facility-Based Competition: 



















This paper can be downloaded from 
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/index_html%28magks%29 
 
Coordination: Bernd Hayo • Philipps-University Marburg 
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics • Universitätsstraße 24, D-35032 Marburg 






Göttingen  MAGKS Coexistence of Service- and Facility-Based Competition:
The Relevance of Access Prices for
\Make-or-Buy"-Decisions
Christian M. Bendery& Georg G otz
This Version: February 2011
This paper models competition between two rms, which provide broadband In-
ternet access in regional markets with di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 between static and dynamic eciency does not apply in the sense that
higher access fees might yield both, lower retail prices and higher total coverage.
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1 Introduction
The eects of regulation on investments in telecommunication infrastructures are object of an
ongoing debate due to their importance for economic growth.1 The access regulation regime is
important as it shapes the kind and intensity of competition within the markets and, in par-
ticular, the investment incentives.2 While in the USA mandatory access is on the decline and
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) eliminated unbundling obligations in broad-
band markets in 2005, European's broadband markets are still subject to extensive regulatory
interventions. The European Commission's regulatory framework comprise access obligations
for the network of the telecommunication incumbents if they have signicant market power.3
A noteworthy dierence between the US and most European broadband markets is the level of
platform competition between telephony and cable networks which is very intense in the US.
In many European countries and, in particular, in Germany competition in DSL markets was
the main issue whereas competition between dierent platforms played a minor role or was
restricted to urban areas, respectively. Moreover, a high degree of competition within the DSL
broadband access market was based on reselling incumbents' access products.4
The initial objective of access regulation was to promote competition by providing entrants
the opportunity to establish themselves in the market and successively invest in own infrastruc-
ture facilities to achieve sustainable competition in the long run. Given the experience from
the US and Europe, the success of this stepping-stone or, in European terms, this ladder of
investment approach5 is at least questionable. A range of empirical studies showed that strict
access regulation decrease the investment incentives of entrants within a technology as well
as investments in alternative platforms and suggest that most entrants in telecommunications
markets stayed at the lowest rung and did not climb the ladder.6
Another issue regarding the broadband access markets is the objective to bridge the digital
divide and provide sucient coverage also in sparsely populated regions. While there are some
regions, in particular urban areas, where infrastructure based competition between dierent
technologies takes place, there is concern about regions with only one infrastructure provider
1Cf. R oller & Waverman (2001), Czernich et al. (2009) or Katz et al. (2010).
2Guthrie (2006) provides a comprehensive overview of the eect of dierent regulation regimes and their impact
on investment incentives in network industries. An overview of empirical as well as theoretical studies related
to broadband markets is provided by Cambini & Jiang (2009).
3Cf. Directive (2009/140/EC) (2009, Recital 3).
4Cf. DG Information Society (2007, p.32).
5Cf. Cave & Vogelsang (2003) and Cave (2006).
6For example, Waverman et al. (2007) showed that lower access fees in one technology yields disproportional
lower investments in alternative infrastructures. Friederiszieck, Grajek & R oller (2007) found a negative
eect of access regulation on investments of entrants within one infrastructure based on data from 25 Euro-
pean countries in the period 1997-2006. Hausman & Sidak (2005) examined the stepping stone hypothesis
empirically with data from ve countries and did not nd any evidence for the transition from service- to
facility-based competition.
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and regions without any infrastructure provider, in particular rural areas. The discussion about
regulation in dense areas, often referred to as \black" areas, focuses on the question whether
access regulation is still necessary and some European regulators, e.g. the British Oce of
Communications (OFCOM) and the Austrian Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs-GmbH
(RTR), denied this and made the attempt to relax regulation in some regions. Regarding the
regions with only one infrastructure provider, referred to as \gray" areas, access regulation is
considered as a necessary intervention by most National Regulatory Authorities (NRA) and the
European Commission. The coverage of rural regions with insucient provision of broadband
access infrastructures, often referred to as \white" areas, is a topic of increasing importance.
The European Commission announced strategies to bridge the coverage gaps by the end of
2010, including the opportunity of subsidies.7 Hence, the population density plays a crucial
role regarding infrastructure investments.
As Laont & Tirole (2001, p.7) pointed out, there exists a Schumpeterian trade-o between
the promotion of (service-based) competition to increase social welfare by lowering prices given
investment and encouraging investments ex ante. This trade-o between static eciency, i.e.
intense competition with low prices in a situation with an existing infrastructure, and dy-
namic eciency regarding the investment incentives for new infrastructures is a crucial aspect
for regulation in general8 and for the roll-out of Next Generation Access Networks (NGA) in
telecommunications in particular. Hence, there exists a strong linkage between both topics, the
kind and intensity of competition in the market and the incentives to provide the necessary
infrastructure even in less densely populated areas.
In this paper, we try to enlighten the debate by examining this linkage and analyzing the
eect of the access fee on investment incentives. Our model examines price competition of
two rms, an incumbent and an entrant, in the Internet broadband access market. Both rms
use an infrastructure facility to provide services to consumers in regional markets with dier-
ent population densities. While the incumbent provides broadband access to consumers via
its own infrastructure, the entrant faces a decision between service-based and facility-based
entry. The entrants might buy access from the incumbent and act as reseller, possibly using
alternative providers or own infrastructures at higher network layers. This approach is often
discussed especially in the context of bit stream access to ber-to-the-home (FTTH) networks.
Alternatively, the entrants might invest in own infrastructure facilities, e.g. leasing unbundled
local loops from the incumbent and building own (V)DSL Access Multiplex (VDSLAM). For
instance, this is an approached discussed in Switzerland in the context of NGA where net-
work providers might install several dark ber to each covered household and oer them to
7Cf. BMWi (2009) and Commission of the Euopean Communities (2009).
8Cf. Weisman (2010).
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competitors.
We show that the entrant's investment decision includes a trade-o. On the one hand,
investment yields cost savings in regions with facility-based entry and enables the entrant to
attract more consumers with lower prices. On the other hand, as the entrant becomes more
aggressive, the incumbent becomes more aggressive, too, and retail competition is fostered in
all covered regions. The entrant will take the competition eect of its investments into account
and, therefore, act strategically. Hence, it is not sucient that investment yields average costs
below the access fee in a specic region to trigger facility-based competition.
These results are related to Sappington (2005) and Gayle & Weisman (2007). Sappington
pointed out that the typically implemented cost-based access fees, like Total Element Long
Run Incremental Costs (TELRIC), do not suciently account for the impact of the investment
decision of the entrant on the subsequent retail price competition. Using an Hotelling retail
competition, Sappington showed that the entrant will always make an ecient make-or-buy
decision even if the access fee varies signicantly from incumbent's costs to provide the input.
Gayle & Weisman (2007) showed that this \irrelevance of input prices" does not hold in general.
With reference to Chen (2001), they argued that entrants might choose to purchase the input
from the incumbent to soften downstream competition independent from the relation between
access price and incumbent's cost. This strategic eect also holds in a Bertrand setup with
dierentiated goods, whereas it disappears in a Cournot setting. Mandy (2009) showed in a
more general setup that the irrelevance of the input price on the make-or-buy decision only
holds for restrictive assumptions on demand and that there exists a latitude of access fees
inducing ecient make-or-buy decisions.
In contrast to the cited models, we account for xed investment costs in infrastructure fa-
cilities which yield decreasing instead of constant average costs. Moreover, we take into ac-
count the investment incentives of both, the incumbent and the entrant, because innovations in
telecommunications comprehend the necessity for upgrades and extensions of the existing in-
frastructures. Thereby, the population density plays a crucial role as providing infrastructures
in less densely populated regions involves higher average costs. In the presence of economies of
density, our results show that the entrant will never choose to compete via facility-based entry
in all covered regions and that the incumbent will never provide coverage in all regions. Hence,
our model includes the mentioned \black", \gray", and \white" areas. This result is similar
to the ndings of Faulhaber & Hogendorn (2000), who showed that infrastructure-based entry
will only take place in dense areas whereas the provision of infrastructures in less dense regions
is only protable for the rst provider and total coverage is never achieved without additional
instruments, e.g. an universal service obligation.
As a main result, we show that higher access fees might yield both, lower retail prices and
higher total coverage. Hence, the usual trade-o between static and dynamic eciency, i.e.
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higher retail prices with lower penetration and higher coverage versus lower retail prices with
higher penetration and lower coverage, does not apply in general. This is a major dierence
to the ndings of the closely related papers of Valletti, Hoernig & Barros (2002) and G otz
(2009). Valletti et al. (2002) analyzed the eect of uniform pricing obligations on coverage and
showed that uniform pricing constraints might yield strategic eects between otherwise unre-
lated markets. As a result, such a policy might yield lower investment by both, the incumbent
and the entrant, compared to a situation with geographically dierentiated prices. G otz (2009)
examined a similar setup and showed that there exist mixed-strategy equilibria in the absence
of uniform pricing obligations in which the incumbent alters between high and low prices, i.e.
erce price competition in region with infrastructure competition and monopoly outcomes in
regions without infrastructure-based competition. In a nutshell, these models include a trade-
o between static and dynamic eciency because increasing facility-based competition and
therefore lower retail prices yield lower investments by the incumbent, i.e. lower total coverage.
As we include the opportunity that a competitor enters the market via facility-based as well as
via service-based competition, this trade-o does not necessarily apply in our model. As long as
an entrant rm provides broadband access via the network of the incumbent in regions without
own infrastructures, the eect of increasing facility-based competition, decreasing retail prices
and increasing total demand might dominate the negative eects of more intense competition
on investments.
Lastly, a major dierence to the most papers on the topic of access regulation and invest-
ments in broadband access markets is the presence of switching costs in our model. We provide
a setup which includes a demand allowing for dierent switching costs as well as dierent
reservation utilities for each consumer including an outside option, i.e. not buying broadband
access at all. The motivation for this shaping is twofold. First, the usual assumption about
some sort of product dierentiation between incumbent's and entrants' products does not ex-
plain satisfactorily why entrants oer their products at a lower price. Second, the assumption
of switching costs is in line with empirical ndings, e.g. Gruber & Verboven (2001) or Krat
& Salies (2008). The existence and magnitude of product dierentiation is at least arguable,
especially regarding broadband Internet access via the same technology, e.g. VDSL or DSL
products based on reselling and local loop unbundling. Hence, assuming the presence of con-
sumer switching costs seems more appropriate in the context of broadband access markets via
the same or similar technologies.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 proceeds with the basic setup of our
model. In Section 3, we derive the equilibrium conditions for a benchmark case with only
service-based entry and for the case in which the entrant faces a make-or-buy decision in each
region. Section 4 provides a numerical simulation of our ndings and a discussion of the results.
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Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The model examines a market with two rms, an incumbent, denoted by I, and an entrant,
denoted by E, in the Internet broadband access market. Both rms use an infrastructure
facility to provide services to consumers in regional markets.
In a previous period, denoted as period zero, the incumbent serves the market with a legacy
infrastructure. One may think of a telecommunications network which the incumbent owns as
a former state-owned monopoly or a regulated monopoly constrained to an universal service
obligation. For example, the network might be a public switched telephone network oering
access to the Internet via 56K modem or DSL.
In the rst period, the incumbent might upgrade the network which involves sunk costs FI for
each region, e.g. for DSL access multiplex at the regional telephone exchange or upgrading the
serving area interface for VDSL.9 Furthermore, the competitor enters the market and decides
whether to buy access from the incumbent and resells the access product to the consumers or
to invest in own infrastructure facilities. T hereby, consumers who bought from the incumbent
in period zero and switch to the entrant exhibit switching costs, e.g. information or search
costs.
Demand
The whole market is composed of a continuum of regional markets with uniformly distributed
population densities  2 [0;] and the number of the regions and their density is assumed as a
linear relation. Figure 1 illustrates this setup.10
In each region exists a continuum of consumer types with uniformly distributed reservation
utility i 2 [0;]. Total demand in region  is given by
y(;p) = (   p); (1)
with population density , reservation utility , utility adjustment parameter due to investment
 , and price p. The demand is positively related with the density of a region and y(0)  y(00)
applies for all 0 > 00.
Moreover each consumer type i incorporates a continuum of mass 1 of consumers with
9An alternative modeling with investment in period zero does not alter the results qualitatively. A setup which
allows the incumbent to oer the new service as a monopolist could be interpreted as regulatory holidays.
As this is not the objective of this paper - and the mathematics of such a setup is more complex - we assume
an upgrade of the existing network in the rst period.
10G otz (2009).
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(a) Population density and \name" of region (b) Demand in regions with dierent
population densities
Figure 1: Population density and its eect on demand
switching costs ! 2 [0;!] and ! > 0. The switching costs are only relevant if a consumer
bought from the incumbent in period 0 and switches to the entrant in period 1. Hence, each
consumer i is characterized by a combination of a willingness to pay i and switching costs !i
so that the consumer population in a region  is on a two-dimensional continuum in the domain
R2
+ = [0;]  [0;!]. Note that there exists no correlation between the reservation utility and
the switching costs. There exist consumers with a low willingness to pay and high switching
costs as well as consumers with a high willingness to pay and low switching costs.
This gives us the opportunity to analyze dierent reservation utilities as well as dierent in-
tensities of switching costs. Even though both parameters are exogenous, both might - at least
to some extent - be inuenced by the rms and the regulatory authority. While rms' decision
towards the underlying technology might aect the utility and willingness to pay, e.g. due to
higher bandwidth or lower latency, the regulatory authorities might inuence the amount of
switching costs with obligation regarding switching duration etc.
Both rms provide a homogeneous good, broadband Internet access, to the consumers and
the entrant gets two kinds of demand.
First, there are consumers who bought from the incumbent in the previous period and there-
fore exhibit switching costs. Consumers switch to the entrant if their net-utility increases and
the crucial switching costs of the indierent consumer !k could be written as
i   pE   !i  i   pI ) !k = pI   pE:
The indierent consumer and the switching consumers are illustrated in Figure 2a. Every
customer with switching costs less or equal !k switches to the entrant whereas customers with
switching costs greater than !k stay with the incumbent. Therefore, the entrant has to undercut
incumbent's price to gain a positive demand from previously served consumers. Note that this
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is independent of the reservation utility i and, therefore, demand of the incumbent in period
1 is not subject to the reservation utility as long as buying the product yields a positive net









!  1. Figure 2b illustrates that higher maximum switching ! yield a lower share
of switching consumers if the price dierence of both rms does not change. Thus, entrant's
demand from those consumers decreases with the maximum switching costs.
(a) Switching consumers (b) Variation of the maximum switching
costs
Figure 2: Switching costs and share of switching consumers
Second, consumers who did not buy in the previous period will always buy from the rm
with the lower price. As tie-breaking rule, new consumers will slightly prefer the incumbent if
both rms oer the product for the same price and only choose the entrant if pE < pI. As the
entrant has to undercut the incumbent's price to get some of the old consumers, the unattached
consumers will always buy from the entrant. Demand of those unattached consumers is given
by
(   pE)   (   pI0) = ((   1) + pI0   pE):
with  normalized to 1 in the previous period and   1 as adjustment of the reservation utility
due to the upgrade of the network in the rst period.
The incumbent's demand in region  in period 1 is its demand from the previous period minus
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yI0 + ((   1) + pI0   pE) (3)
For simplicity, let us assume that the incumbent acts as a myopic monopolist in period zero.12
Thus, the equilibrium price in period zero is given by pI0 = =2 and equation (1) yields the
equilibrium demand yI0(;pI0) = =2. The demand functions of both rms, Equations (2) and








(((2   1)! + pI)   pE(2! + )) (5)
Equations (4) and (5) illustrate that both rms face linear demands in each region  subject
to the maximum switching costs !, the reservation utility  the price of the competitor and
the rm's own price. Obviously, the demand of a rm increases with the price of the com-
petitor and decreases with the rm's own price. Both demands increase with the reservation
utility and the population density. The eect of the switching costs on both demands goes in
opposite directions, i.e. for higher switching costs the incumbent's demand increases and the
entrant's demand decreases. This is straightforward because fewer consumers will switch from
the incumbent to the entrant given a constant price dierence. The entrant's demand is also
inuenced by the utility adjustment parameter . The higher the utility from the upgrade, the
higher the entrant's demand from new consumers. To ensure that the upgrade does not change
the market size, we assume that  is such that y(;pE)  y0(;0), which holds in equilibrium.
To summarize, we derive continuous and dierentiable demand functions which show intuitive
features for the dierent parameters. Moreover, these demand functions allow an analysis of
consumer switching costs and dierent reservation utilities including an outside option, i.e.
consumers not buying broadband access at all.
11This demand holds as long as (   pE)  (   pI0) ,   pE= + 1=2. Otherwise, it is not ensured that
all of the incumbent's previous consumers have a suciently high reservation utility.
12Given that the incumbent anticipates the entry in the rst period, the price in previous period will decreasing
with increasing switching costs as the incumbent tries to attract more consumers in period zero. Compare
e.g. Klemperer (1987).
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Firms' prot maximization
Both rm's maximize their prots over all covered regions, consisting of regions in which the
entrant invested in own infrastructure facilities, i.e. [E;], and regions in which the entrant
buys access from the incumbent, i.e. [I;E]. As simplication, we assume that marginal costs
of providing broadband access to the consumers equal zero and therefore the maximization



















with the prices pj, the demand functions yj, the investment costs Fj, and the access fee .
The prot functions include the assumption that entrant's investment will always be lower
or equal to the incumbent's investment, i.e. E  I. As we will see later, this assumption
holds in equilibrium as long as both rms face similar investment costs.
Note that the entrant will only buy access from the incumbent if the access fee is below the
retail price. Otherwise, the entrant would realize losses and consequently not provide services
in regions without own infrastructure. This would yield the same outcome as in Valletti et al.
(2002) or G otz (2009) with facility-based competition in regions with investments of both rms.
Alternatively, if the entrant has to provide the service in all covered regions even if the access
fee is above the equilibrium prices, this might be interpreted as some sort of universal service
obligation for entrants. Alternatively, one might think about a product for which the entrant
needs to compete in all covered regions, e.g. mobile networks and the entrant uses roaming.
Timing of the game
The model is separated in three stages and the timing is as follows:
1. ACCESS STAGE
The regulator sets the access fee 
2. INVESTMENT STAGE
Both rms choose their investment level, i.e. the smallest covered regions I and E, and
the entrant choose whether to buy access in the remaining covered regions
3. PRICING STAGE
Both rms set their prices pI and pE simultaneously and compete for consumers
Regarding the access stage, we assume that the regulator is able to credibly commit to the
announced access fee. If this is not the case, the order of stages 1 and 2 are reversed and a
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hold-up problem is probable because the regulator has an incentive to introduce a lower access
fee which does not account suciently for the irreversible xed investment costs.
We analyze the investment stage as a simultaneous decision even though the entrant's decision
to buy access is subject to total coverage, i.e. the incumbent's investment decision. Hence,
the investment stage is a sequential game in which the incumbent chooses its coverage and
thereafter the entrant decides about its investment. To ensure that an analysis as simultaneous
decisions does not alter the results, we assume that the incumbent is not able to credible commit
not to reinvest after the entrant has chosen its investment level.13
At the last stage of the game, both rms set their prices and compete in the broadband
access retail market.
3 Equilibria
Before we analyze the equilibrium in the case where the entrant might chose to invest in own
infrastructure facilities, let us consider the case in which the entrant acts as pure reseller of
the incumbent's product. This case with only service-based competition is a subset of the case
with facility-based competition as the opportunity of pure reselling of incumbent's bit stream
access products still applies. However, the case without facility-based entry provides a helpful
benchmark and gives some insights into the general processes on one-way access regulation in
the context of switching costs and economies of density.
3.1 Benchmark: Service-Based Entry
In this benchmark case, the regulatory authority announces the access fee and thereafter the
incumbent decides about its investment, i.e. the last covered region I, which involves invest-
ment costs FI in each covered region. Afterwards, both rms choose their prices pI and pE
simultaneously. The entrant resells the product in all covered regions and pays an access fee 
per consumer.
Pricing stage
Solving recursively, we rst derive the optimal price decisions of both rms at the last stage
of the game. The prot of the incumbent with service-based competition, denoted by sbc, is
13A more detailed discussion of this game structure is available in G otz (2010).













pI(! + pE   pI) + ((pI   pE) + !((2   1)   2pE))
4!
  (   I)FI
The incumbent maximizes its prot over all covered regions. This includes the earnings from
old consumers, not switching to the entrant, the earning from selling access to the entrant and
the investment costs per region.
The entrant provides the service in all covered regions and pays an access fee per consumer.












(pE   )(((2   1)! + pI)   pE(2! + ))
4!
Dierentiating the prot functions with respect of the rms prices and rearranging both rst




! = 0 , pI =
1
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((2   1)! + pI)
2! + 

Both rms increase their prices with the price of the competitor. Therefore prices are strategic
complements. The eects of both, the access fee and the switching costs, are positive. The
incumbent's best response is independent of the reservation utility whereas the entrant's prices
increase with the reservation utility. Intuitively, the dependency of entrant's best response
on the reservation utility is based on the unattached consumers because a higher reservation
utility and a higher additional utility from the investment, i.e. a higher , yields more new
consumers in equilibrium. Note that both prices are independent from the coverage decision of
the incumbent.



















which consist of two parts. The rst term is a mark-up due to the switching costs. The second
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term represents the marginal costs of the entrant. From the derivation of the equilibrium prices
follows that higher maximum switching costs ! yield higher prices and that the the equilibrium




E , increases with the switching costs. For the case without switching costs, i.e.
! = 0, we get a Bertrand outcome with prices equal access fee which are the marginal costs
of the entrant.14 As long as the switching costs are strictly positive, the tie-breaking rule is
irrelevant because the entrant will always choose a price below the incumbent's equilibrium
price. Obviously, the higher the access fee , the higher the entrant's marginal costs from
buying access and the higher both prices. Although this result is straightforward, we capture
this statement as a proposition as it will become important in the discussion of the results with
investments of the entrant.
Proposition 1. If the entrant acts as a pure reseller, i.e. only service-based competition is
realized, the equilibrium prices of both rms increase with the access fee.
Proof. Follows from the derivation of equations 6 and 7 with respect to the access fee. 
Investment stage
Given the equilibrium prices, we can derive the investment decision of the incumbent. The
incumbent will invest as long as the coverage of an additional region yields positive prots.






I yI(p) + yE(p)
whereas yj1 is the demand of the rm in one region subject to the equilibrium prices and
independent from population density.
Substituting the equilibrium prices in the above equation, or alternatively dierentiating
incumbent's reduced prot function with respect to the coverage decision and solving for I,





2((! + (92 + 32! + 32!2))   (92 + 34! + 32!2)) + !((2 + 1) + 4!)2
(8)
14For the case without switching costs, both rms would set their prices equal marginal costs, i.e. equal the
access fee. Given our tie-breaking rule, i.e. a slightly preference of the consumers towards the incumbent,
the incumbent would deter entry. As long as the access fee represents the average costs of the incumbent,
the equilibrium would be the typical outcome of a contestable market as the incumbent would be disciplined
by the possibility of service-based entry without barriers to entry.
15This approach is similar to G otz (2009), Valletti et al. (2002), and Faulhaber & Hogendorn (2000).
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Obviously, the investment costs have a negative impact on the coverage as the nominator
decreases and therefore the density of the last covered region increases. Intuitively, if the
investment costs increase, more consumers are necessary to cover the investment costs and the
density of the regions providing zero prots must be higher. Full coverage is only provided
for investment costs equal zero. Otherwise, the entrant will only provide partial coverage and
broadband access is not provided in sparsely populated regions. The reservation utility ,
the utility adjustment parameter , the maximum switching costs !, and the access fee  are
positive related with the coverage decision of the incumbent. The higher , , !, or , the lower
the density in the last covered region sbc
I . Note that the investment decision of the incumbent
is not subject to the region with the highest density but determined by its prots in the last
covered region.
This benchmark provides a dierence to the related literature of Valletti et al. (2002) and G otz
(2009). As the entrant accede the market in all covered markets via service-based competition,
the incumbent is not able to dierentiate prices geographically and both rms compete with
uniform prices.
Proposition 2. If the entrant acts as a pure reseller, i.e. only service-based competition is
realized, the equilibrium coverage increases with the access fee as long as the access fee is not




Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The incumbent's earnings per consumer
increase directly with a higher access fee and indirectly due to higher equilibrium prices. Be-
cause the demand of switching consumers is not subject to the prices in absolute manner but
the price dierence and both rms increase their prices, the eect on incumbent's demand is
negligible. The entrant's demand for access decreases with higher prices as the demand of
unattached consumers decreases. However, the entrant's decreasing demand for access to the
incumbent's network is overcompensated by the positive eect of higher access fees on the in-
cumbent's prots as long as the access fee is not too high. Hence, the incumbent's prots in
the last covered region increase with the access fee and the last region providing zero prots
decreases, i.e. has a lower density.




(2((! + (92 + 32! + 32!2))   (92 + 34! + 32!2)) + !(3 + 4!)2)
2(3 + 8!)2 (9)
For this investment costs, the incumbent's prot will be zero in the region with the highest
density  and for FI < F max
I , the incumbent will invest even if the regulator sets an access fee
of zero. At rst sight, this might be contra intuitive but could be explained via the existence
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of strictly positive switching costs. Even if the entrant get costless access and the incumbent
will lose consumers to the entrant, some consumers will stay with the incumbent. Hence the
incumbent is able to make positive prots and will invest in some regions. Note that investment
might be very low subject to the amount of switching costs.
(a) Equilibrium prices (b) Equilibrium Coverage
Figure 3: Equilibrium prices and coverage with service-based entry subject to the access fee 
(for  = 100, ! = 40,  = 1, and FI = 30000)
To summarize our results, i.e. Propositions 1 and 2, there is a (well known) trade-o between
static and dynamic eciency, i.e. lower retail prices for given infrastructure versus higher prices
and more investment. Figure 3 illustrates these results. The same applies for the switching
costs. Higher maximum switching costs decrease the intense of competition, yield higher prices
as well as higher coverage and vice versa.
The eect of higher access fees and , therefore, increasing equilibrium prices and investment
incentives is similar to analysis of cost-based access pricing, e.g. the TELRIC, compared to
retail-minus, e.g. a price cap. Several papers showed that the investment incentives of an
incumbent are always higher if the regulatory authority chooses a retail-minus regulation and
allow for higher access fees (Compare Sarmento & Brand~ ao (2007) or G otz (2009)).
Even though, the obtained results just conrm previous results, they provide a useful bench-
mark for the situation with investments of the entrant.
3.2 Facility- and Service-Based Entry
Let us now consider a case where the entrant faces a make-or-buy decision, i.e. might choose be-
tween service-based and facility-based entry in every region  2 [I;]. For instance, one might
think of this setup as facility-based competition from an alternative infrastructure provider, e.g.
cable, who resells (V)DSL in regions without own network.16 This is a major dierence to the
16This would be similar to the business case of CableCom, Swiss' main cable provider, who provided broadband
access via its cable network and via reselling of DSL from the former Swiss' telecommunications incumbent
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related models from Faulhaber & Hogendorn (2000), Valletti et al. (2002), and G otz (2009). Al-
though the assumptions about population densities and a monopolistic infrastructure provider
in some regions are basically the same, the incumbent is not able to act as a monopolist in
regions where other rms do not provide own infrastructures as there exists service-based com-
petition. Hence, while their models examine infrastructure-based competition between dierent
technologies17 and rms might only compete with other rms if they provide their own infras-
tructure, the entrant is able to compete in all covered regions regardless of its investments in
our model.
Furthermore, the setup might be interpreted as an analysis of the ladder of investment.
Thereby, we reduce Cave (2006)'s investment ladder to two ladder spokes, i.e. bit stream access
and local loop unbundling. This interpretation does not explicitly account for the additional
rental costs of the local loop. Instead of an increasing bit stream access fee one might think of
a decreasing monthly rental rate for the local loop. Even though the static setup of the model
might be seen as contradiction to the dynamic aspects of the ladder concept at rst sight,
increasing access fees could be interpreted as changes of the access fee or the regulation regime
over time.18 Let us assume that initial entry is solely service-based and grants the entrant
the opportunity to establish itself in the market. In subsequent periods, the entrant has three
opportunities. He invests in all regions, he might invest in some regions and loose his consumers
in regions without investment, or he has to provide the service in regions without investment via
reselling. Given the objective of the ladder approach { entrants' establishment in the market
and successive investment { the third opportunity seems suitable for the modeling of subsequent
periods. Thereby, the model oers some insights regarding the investment incentives of entrants
without modeling the ladder of investment as a dynamic game explicitly.
In opposite to the benchmark case, the entrant faces a trade-o in this setup. On the
one hand, the entrant avoids the access fee in regions with own infrastructure facilities and
consequently might lower its costs. On the other hand, prices are strategic complements and
therefore a price decrease due to lower costs yields a more intense competition. Both aspects are
similar to Sappington (2005) and Gayle & Weisman (2007). The entrant's ecient make-or-buy
decision accounts for the competition eect and therefore higher access fees are implementable.
A major dierence is the presence of an investment decision of both rms and the question
whether and how entrant's investment aects the incumbent's coverage decision.
SwissCom.
17E.g. cable and DSL network providers. Note that Faulhaber & Hogendorn (2000) model competition between
dierent cable network providers, i.e. competition with one technology.
18Even though, the concept of increasing access fee over time implies some legal concerns, e.g. discrimination
of later entry (compare Cave (2006, p.233)), the eects of such policies could be analyzed within the model.
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Pricing stage
In comparison to the benchmark case, the incumbent earnings from the access fee are reduced
to those regions in which the entrant does not invest, i.e. up to the smallest covered region E.
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Thereby, incumbent's prots include the investment costs over all covered regions, the earning
from its consumers, and the earnings from selling access to the entrant in regions without
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and includes the earnings from its consumers in all covered regions, the costs from purchasing
access in regions without investment, and the investment costs in regions with facility-based
entry. For an access fee above the equilibrium price, the second part of the prot function
would disappear if the entrant does not have to resell the incumbent's access in regions without
own infrastructures.



































































Comparing the equilibrium prices with the benchmark case (equations (6) and (7)) shows that
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the eect of the access fee on the prices is lowered by a ratio between the regions not covered by
the entrant and total coverage, i.e. the ratio of service-based competition. Thus, the benchmark
case is a subset of this case in which the weight of the access fee on prices equals 1. As long as
the entrant does not invest, Proposition 1 applies. If the entrant invests, the weight is lower and
prices decrease with the investment of the entrant, i.e. a decrease of E. Otherwise, the same
eects apply as in the benchmark case, i.e. the equilibrium prices increase with the reservation
utility , the utility adjustment parameter , and the maximum switching costs !.
Because the entrant's investment decision is subject to the access fee, too, it is ambiguous
which eect of  dominates. On the one hand, if the access fee increases, prices increase due to
the direct eect. On the other side, increasing access fees will increase investment and decrease
prices due to the indirect eect. This means, if the entrant invests, the entrant acts more
aggressively due to lower average marginal costs. The incumbent reacts and lowers its prices
due to strategic complementary. Either the direct or the indirect eect might dominate.
Proposition 3. If the entrant invests in own infrastructure facilities, the equilibrium prices of
both rms decrease with the extent of facility-based competition.
Proof. Follows from the derivation of equations (10) and (11) with respect to the entrant's
investment decision E. 
Given the equilibrium prices, we can derive the equilibrium price dierence of both rms !k,

















+ (1   )
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In equilibrium, the price dierence between the incumbent and the entrant increases with the
maximum switching costs because the entrant has to undercut incumbent's price further to
attract consumers. As long as the entrant only competes via service-based entry, i.e. E = ,
the price dierence increases with the access fee, whereas facility-based entry leads to a lower
price dierence. As for the equilibrium prices, the net eect of the access fee is ambiguous.
This is a dierence to the benchmark case, where both, the equilibrium prices and the price
dierence were strictly increasing with the access fee. We discuss this nding in more detail
below.
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Entrant's investment decision
Substituting the equilibrium prices (10) and (11) into the entrant's prot function and dier-
entiation this reduced prot function with respect to the investment decisions yields
@E(p)
@E
= FE   4E!
 











! = 0 (12)
Solving the rst order condition of entrant's prots with respect to the coverage decision E
yields a polynomial of degree three and therefore three solutions which are non-trivial.
Proposition 4. A unique and optimal investment decision of the entrant, i.e. a best response
to the incumbent's investment decision , denoted by 
E, satisfying the rst order condition and
maximizing the prots exists in the admissible range 
E 2 [I;]. For suciently low investment






















invests in own infrastructure facilities in some regions.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
The rst order condition (12) gives some insights regarding the optimal investment decision
of the entrant.
Figure 4 illustrates the rst order condition for dierent access fees and dierent investment
costs. Note that the intersection of the rst order condition and the abscissa represents the
optimal investment. The optimal investment, which satises equation (12), decreases with the
investment costs, i.e. 
E increases, and increases with the access fee , i.e. 
E decreases. This is
intuitive as higher investment costs lower the investment incentives and buying access becomes
cheaper compared to building own facilities and vice versa. Increasing switching costs aects
the investment incentives in a positive manner. The higher the switching costs, the higher the
equilibrium investments of the entrant. Again, this is intuitive and analog to the benchmark
case as higher switching costs soften competition, yield higher equilibrium retail prices and
therefore increase the investment incentives. Note that for switching costs equal to zero, the
entrant will never invest as long as investment is not costless because the resulting Bertrand-
prices would not allow entry for positive xed costs. The reservation utility and the utility
adjustment parameter have a positive impact on investments, i.e. the higher  or  the lower

E satisfying the rst order condition.
The entrant's decision between investment and reselling via bought access comprehends a
decision between two cost structures, namely xed costs and no marginal costs or no xed costs
and marginal costs equal to the access fee. Let us assume that the entrant's investment decision
is solely based on the costs. The entrant would choose to invest until its average costs equal
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(a) Dierent access fees (b) Dierent investment costs
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Obviously, this condition diers from the entrant's rst order condition. Hence,the investment
decision of the entrant takes more aspects into account than just the trade-o between marginal
and average costs. We can show that the optimal investment based on this simplied decision
rule always yields higher investment.As the equilibrium prices are decreasing with the range
of facility-based competition, the entrant faces a trade-o. On the one hand, the entrant
would like to invest as this yields lower costs. On the other hand, investments foster retail
price competition because prices are strategic complements and the incumbent becomes more
aggressively if the entrant decrease its price.
Proposition 5. For positive investment costs and access fees, the entrant acts strategically. In
order to soften retail competition, it invests less compared to the case without consideration of
the eect of investment on prices.
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 


























(3 + 8!)2 (13)
For investment costs above this threshold, the rst order condition is strictly positive and
reselling dominates investment. The higher the access fee, the higher the investment costs for
which the entrant is willing to invest. Dierentiating F max
E shows that the maximum investment
cost for which investment takes place increases with the switching costs, with the density of
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region , with the reservation utility, and with the utility adjustment parameter. The eect
of the incumbent's investment might be positive as well as negative subject to the relation
between the access fee and the reservation utility. If incumbent's investment is low, i.e. I is
close to , the maximum investment costs go to innity.
Given the investment costs are suciently low, i.e. FE < F max
E , the entrant's rst order










and convex for higher access fees. As long as the investment costs are below













(3 + 8!)2 (15)
the entrant's initial investment takes place in the region with the highest density. For investment
costs above ^ FE, a higher access fee is necessary to trigger investment. Due to the convexity
of the rst order condition for such high , i.e. for  > ^ , the rst order condition does not
become zero at the point E =  at rst. The entrant's initial investment does not take place
















Hence, there is a discontinuity in the entrant's investment function subject to the access fee if
the investment costs are above ^ FE. Figure 5 illustrates the initial investment of the entrant in
region ^ 
E for investment costs ^ FE < FE < F max
E .
Figure 5: First order condition of the entrant for investment costs ^ FE < FE < Fmax
E
As long as the access fee is below ^ , the entrant's rst order condition is strictly positive and
19The formal derivation of this region is part of the proof of Proposition 4 in Appendix A.2.
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reselling dominates investment. For an access fee equal ^ , the entrant's rst order condition is
tangent to the abscissa at the point E = ^ 
E. Thus, the entrant initially invests in all regions
with density greater or equal ^ 
E and invests in more regions if the access fee increases further.
This investment behavior could be explained via the price eect of investment and entrant's
demand. For high investment costs, the entrant will choose to resell in all regions as long as the
access fee is suciently low. If the access fee becomes too high, the entrant invests and prices
decrease. Initial investment in the densest region  would only yield a small price decrease
whereas the price eect of investments in all regions is very strong. If the investment incentives
are suciently strong, i.e. if the access fee is suciently high, the entrant invests down to ^ 
E
at once which yields a higher price decrease and sucient new consumers could be attracted to
cover the expense of investment. Keep in mind that a price decrease does not yield signicantly
higher demand from old consumers as the incumbent lowers its price, too.
Incumbent's investment decision
The next step is to analyze the investment decision of the incumbent. As in the benchmark
case, it is determined by the prots in the last covered region. Investment will take place
down to the region in which the incumbent's prot equals zero. Hence, a simplied optimal
investment decision, as in the benchmark case, is given by









I) + (((2   1)! + p
I)   p
E(2! + ))
Obviously, the higher the investment costs, the lower the investment. The eect of incumbent's
price on investment is ambiguous. Based on equilibrium prices, a decrease of pI increases the
denominator because the decrease in incumbent's demand does not compensate for the higher
earnings per consumer, i.e. p
I(! + p
E   p
I) decreases. On the other side, a higher price
increases the denominator as entrant's demand increases and therefore earnings from selling
access to the entrant increases, too, i.e. (((2   1)! + p
I)   p
E(2! + )) increases.
Substituting equilibrium prices in above expression and rearranging, or alternatively dieren-
tiating the incumbent's reduced prot function with respect to the investment decision, yields
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! = 0 (17)
This equation is non-trivial and solving for the investment decision I yields a polynomial of
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degree ve which could not be solved in general.
Proposition 6. A unique optimal investment decision of the incumbent, i.e. a best response to
the investment of the entrant, denoted by 
I, satisfying the rst order condition and maximizing
the prots I in the admissible range 
I 2 [0;] exists for investment costs FI  F max
I =
(2((!+(92+32!+32!2)) (92+34!+32!2))+!((2+1)+4!)2)
2(3+8!)2 and if the access fee is not too high,














Proof. First, the incumbent will never provide full coverage if the investment costs are positive,
i.e. for FI > 0 always follows 
I > 0. This nding is intuitive as demand in the least dense
region is approaching zero and the incumbent is not able to cover its investment expense.





(2((! + (92 + 32! + 32!2))   (92 + 34! + 32!2)) + !((2 + 1) + 4!)2)
2(3 + 8!)2 :
(18)
Otherwise, the rst order condition is strictly positive and the incumbent will not invest.
Again, this is intuitive as the incumbent's prots in the densest region are not sucient to
cover excessively high investment costs. Note that the maximal investment costs are the same
as in the benchmark case.
Given the restriction on the investment costs, the rst order condition is strictly decreasing













! + (92 + 32! + 32!2)
92 + 34! + 32!2
Note that this is a sucient and no necessary condition because the rst order condition might
increase for higher access fees.20 This boundary of  is at minimum, i.e. for E =  and  = 1,
slightly below . Hence, this upper boundary is more a technical restriction and states that
an access fee around or above the reservation utility, and therefore equilibrium prices above
the reservation utility, yield no investment which is straight forward. Because the rst order
condition (17) has opposite signs in the limits, i.e. lim
I!0
@I(p)




and is monotonic decreasing in I, a unique optimal response 
I exists. 
The derivations of the rst order condition show that a higher reservation utility yields higher
optimal investment of the incumbent, i.e. 
I decreases, in the reservation utility  and the
20For higher access fees, there might be two solutions for the rst order condition and an optimal investment
decision might still exist.
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utility adjustment parameter . This is straightforward as a higher willingness to pay increase
both, the equilibrium prices and the amount of new consumers. The eect of higher maximum
switching costs is ambiguous. Although the optimal coverage increase with higher switching
costs for most parameter combinations, this eect is reversed for some combinations. If the
entrant invests more, i.e. E decrease, the optimal investment of the incumbent increases, too.
The intuition of this strategic complementary is as follows. If the entrant invests more, retail
prices are decreasing and therefore entrant's demand from unattached consumers increases. As
long as the entrant buys access in the last covered region from the incumbent, the incumbent's
prot in last covered region increases due to the additional demand from unattached consumers
and the entrant's increasing demand for access. Therefore, the incumbent might provide the
infrastructure in a less densely populated region.
Moreover, the derivations show that higher access fees increase the optimal investment of the
incumbent. The access fee has a doubled eect on total coverage, a rst order eect through
the incumbent's rst order condition and a second order eect due to the increasing investment
of the entrant. This nding might be interpreted as a sign that the indirect coverage eect
overcompensates the direct eect of the access fee on prices as the second order eect might
be explained by decreasing prices and increasing demand of new consumers. Given this, the
prots of the incumbent based on higher access fees would not only increase due to increasing
revenues per consumer but also due to the increasing demand for access in the last covered
region.
From the analysis of the rst order conditions, it becomes clear that both investment incentives






decreases. Although the equilibrium prices are unambiguously increasing with the access fee
as long as the entrant does not invest, the net eect of the access fee on prices is ambiguous.
Even so, the discussion of both investment decisions indicates that the net eect is negative,
i.e. an increasing access fee yields lower prices if the entrant invests, and the simulation below
will show that this is in fact the case.
Note that the rst order conditions regarding the investment decisions of the entrant (12)
and the incumbent (17) could not be solved analytically due to the polynomial equations of
high degrees and the equilibrium prices could not be generalized further. Again, we refer the
reader to the subsequent simulation. In this section we showed that best investment responses
of both rms exist and the numerical simulation conrms the existence of an equilibrium for a
range of parameters.
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Eect of the access price
Lastly, we analyze the eect of the access fee on entrant's investment decision. To be more
precise, we derive the access fees leading to the corner solution, i.e. no investment. Withal, we
show that the entrant will never invest in all covered regions. Hence, we can determine ranges
of the access fee which yield interior solutions with an interception of both response functions
and consequently with partial facility-based competition.
Let  denote the access fee for which the entrant is indierent between make-or-buy or, in
other words, the lower boundary of access fee for which the entrant starts to invest. Solving




























For low investment costs FE  ^ FE, the entrant starts its investment in the densest region 











Hence, for this access fee and investment costs less or equal ^ FE, the entrant is indierent
between investment and reselling in region .22 Higher access fees yield investment in some
regions whereas the crucial access fee is only subject to the reservation utility, the utility
adjustment parameter, the switching costs, and the investment costs and independent from the
investment decision of the incumbent.
For high investment costs FE > ^ FE, the entrant starts its initial investment in region ^ 
E,
as dened in equation (16). Substituting this region in equation (19) and solving for the
access fee yields a non-trivial expression. Moreover, this access fee is subject to incumbent's
optimal investment decision which depends on the access fee, too. Hence, solving this equation
analytically is not possible due to the high degree polynomials. In general, we can note that
for high investment costs, the entrant initially invests in region ^ 
E for an access fee equal ^ , as
dened in equation (14). Given these equations, numerical solutions for the access fee inducing
investment as well as as the region up to which the entrant initially invests are deducible even
for high investment costs.
21Solving the rst order condition for the access fee yields a quadratic function and therefore two solutions.
Assume investment costs of FE = 0. The entrant would only buy access if it is costless too. If we choose the
solution with the addition of the square root, the lower boundary, i.e. the access fee for which the entrant
is indierent between buying access and investment, would be strictly positive. Hence, the solution with
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for ^ FE < FE  F max
E
(20)
Proposition 7. As long as the investment costs of the entrant are not too high, i.e. FE  F max
E ,
there exists a unique access fee  for which the entrant is indierent between make-or-buy and
for all access fees greater than  the entrant will invest in some regions.
Proof. Follows from above arguments. 
Now we can show that in equilibrium the entrant will never invest in all covered regions as
long as the dierence between the investment costs of both rms is not too high.
Proposition 8. As long as the investment costs of the entrant are not too low compared to the
investment costs of the incumbent, i.e. FE > FI
4(4 1)!(+2!)
!+(92+32!+32!2),




(ii) the entrant always invests less than the incumbent, i.e. 
E > 
I applies.
Proof. For a proof of (i) see Appendix A.4. Combined with Proposition 7 follows (ii). 
Hence, for all  <  the entrant does not invest and for all    the entrant invests in
dense regions and might buy access in the less dense regions. Figure 6 illustrates the lower
boundaries and the set of  which yields partial facility-based competition.
Figure 6: Lower boundary of the access fee 
The lower boundary is increasing with the investment costs which is straightforward. The
higher the costs for building own infrastructures, the lower the investment incentives. Hence,
the access fee has to increase to induce investment.
Furthermore, using the derivations of  it becomes clear the boundary decrease with the
reservation utility, with the utility adjustment parameter, and with the maximum consumer
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switching costs, i.e. lower access fees are sucient to induce investment. For investment
costs above ^ FE, for which it is never optimal for the entrant to start investment in region , the
necessary access fee to induce investment could not be derived analytically. However, numerical
simulations show that starting at the point  = ^ , for which the minimum of entrant's rst
order condition equals zero, the access fee increases with the investment costs. Note that as
long incumbent's investment is not too low, i.e. 
I close to , the slope of  subject to the
investment costs is higher for the second case. Intuitively, if the entrant initially invests in more
regions, the access fee has to increase further to induce this investment.
4 Illustration and Discussion of the Results
After deriving the equilibrium conditions, we illustrate and discuss the ndings. We will discuss
reasonable values and ranges for the parameters to provide demonstrative exemplications and
to adjust the results to empirical ndings. Moreover, we will discuss possible extensions and
adjustments of the existing model and the robustness of some of the underlying assumptions.
4.1 Parameter Adjustment
In this section, we want to determine the exogenous and endogenous parameters determined
by the model. Moreover, the exogenous parameters access fee and maximum switching costs
could be inuenced by the regulatory authority.
The population density in the densest region  is assumed as 100. We choose this value for
two reasons. First, the average population density in Europe is around 100 people per square
kilometer so that the assumed value is not unrealistic high or low. Second, the value could
be interpreted as ratio and the region with the densest population is represented with 100%
density.
The highest reservation utility  is assumed as 100, too. Again, this could be interpreted
as ratio and the highest willingness to pay has a value of 100%. Furthermore, a price for a
broadband access product in between 0e and 100e seems reasonable.
The utility adjustment parameter  is assumed as 1 as the additional benet from new
telecommunications infrastructures are uncertain prior to the investment and a conservative
estimation seems reasonable.
As both parameters, the population density in the densest region and the reservation utility,
are strictly exogenous and could be interpreted as relative values, both will be seen as xed
and not be varied within the simulation.
The value of the maximum switching costs ! is assumed to be below the reservation utility
to avoid a complete lock-in of consumers. Furthermore, the maximum switching costs have
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to be strictly positive to avoid a Bertrand-Equilibrium with price equals marginal costs and
no investment at all. For the beginning, let us assume maximum switching costs of ! = 40,
i.e. switching costs below the original price. This assumption will be relaxed later and we
will discuss the results for dierent values. Note, that the maximum switching costs are per
se an exogenous parameter but that regulatory guidelines might inuence them. An example
for such an inuence of the regulatory guidelines on the switching costs is the specications
regarding number portability in the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC) but could also apply
if the regulator species maximum contract durations or switch duration if a consumer changes
her provider.
For simplicity, the investment costs of the entrant FE and the incumbent FI are assumed to
be equal. Thereby, we connive at the fact that costs for capital might be higher for entrants or
that there might be economies of scale or scope for the incumbent. As investment costs of zero
obviously lead to full coverage of both rms, the investment costs are assumed to be strictly
positive. Furthermore, there are three values for the investment costs which seems crucial
or at least remarkable. First, for investment costs FI > F max
I , as dened in equation (18),
the incumbent's rst order condition (17) does not become zero and therefore the incumbent
would never invest. For the given assumptions, the crucial investment costs per region are
between 110 094 for  = 0 and 285 172 for  = 
2. Second, the initial investment decision of
the entrant is determined by  which includes two cases and an inner boundary at ^ FE subject
to incumbent's investment decision, as dened in equation (15). If the incumbent does not
invest the investment costs ^ FE equals 0 and if the incumbent provides full coverage ^ FE equals
37 461. Third, for investment costs FE > F max
E , as dened in equation (13), the entrant's
rst order condition (12) is strictly positive and the entrant will always prefer reselling in all
regions. The maximum investment costs are subject to incumbent's investment and the access
fee. Given the assumptions about the other parameters and an high access fee  = 
2, the
maximum investment costs goes to innity if incumbent's investment goes to  and against
F max
E = 52 997:8 if the incumbent provides full coverage. Given these values, we will simulate
results for investment costs between 10 000 and 50 000 to get results for both cases of the
lower boundary . As comparison, recent studies estimated the costs of providing broadband
access subject to the underlying technology between 300e for VDSL and 2 200e for FTTH
per household.23 Taking the capacity of a serving area interface into account yields investment
costs of approximately 30 000e for the VDSL upgrade of one serving area interface.24
The last parameter to dene, the access fee , will be the independent variable to determine
the price and investment decisions. Given the other restrictions and the results from the
benchmark case, the access fee will be varied between zero and 50. Note that the entrant will
23Cf. Katz et al. (2009) and Elixmann et al. (2008).
24Please note that we might implement higher investment costs if we assume a higher utility adjustment
parameter . Hence, investments in more expensive ber-to-the-home networks are feasible, too.
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only act as reseller in regions without infrastructure if its equilibrium price is greater or equal
the access fee. Otherwise, the entrant will only compete via facility-based competition in some
regions and the results of G otz (2009) will apply. We do not account for this in our simulation
explicitly because the main results do not change qualitatively and our model does not include a
benchmark with pure facility-based competition. Alternatively, we might interpret the situation
in which the entrant buys access even though the access price is above its equilibrium price
such that the provision of service in all covered regions is very important. As an example, one
might think of roaming in mobile access technologies.
4.2 Simulation Results
As there exist no closed-form solutions for the investment decisions of the entrant and the
incumbent due to the polynomials of high degree, we illustrate the equilibrium results with
numerical simulations and discus them. First, we show how the access fee inuences the equi-
librium prices. Second, we analyze the eect of the access fee on the the investment decisions.
Third, we show the impact on demand and prots. Fourth, we provide a reference point for
the access fee by simulating the resulting average costs.
Pricing decisions
The equilibrium prices subject to the access fee for low and intermediate investment costs are
illustrated in Figure 7. Both prices change in the same manner and the dierence between both
is based on and increases with the switching costs.
(a) Low investment costs
(F = 10 000)
(b) Intermediate investment costs
(F = 30 000)
Figure 7: Equilibrium prices subject to the access fee (for  = 100,  = 1,  = 100, ! = 40)
The equilibrium price curve is subdivided in two sections. Prices increase with the access fee
as long as the entrant does not invest, i.e. as long as  < . This yields the same results as in
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the benchmark case. The entrant acts as a pure reseller who buys access from the incumbent.
For access fees above , the entrant starts to invest and prices decrease with the access fee
and with the investment of the entrant. Reconsidering the discussion of the equilibrium prices
subject to the investment decisions (equations (10) and (11)), the indirect eect of the access
fee via the investment decision dominates the direct eect of the access fee on prices.
The intuition behind the decreasing prices is straightforward. The entrant has to undercut the
incumbent's price to attract consumers from the incumbent and thereby gains new consumers.
For access fees above  the entrant starts to invest in the densest areas. The cost decreasing
eect of investment dominates the competitive eect of investment, i.e. the cost savings in
regions with investment are suciently high to overcompensate the decreasing earnings per
consumer in all regions. Hence, the entrant becomes more aggressive and the incumbent reacts
by lowering its prices, too.
Figure 8: Equilibrium prices subject to the access fee for high investment costs
(for  = 100,  = 1,  = 100, ! = 40, and F = 50 000)
In the case with high investment costs F > ^ FE, illustrated in Figure 8, equilibrium prices
drop abruptly at . This is based on the higher initial investment of the entrant down to region
^ 
E. The entrant attracts a high amount of new consumers at once and the incumbent decrease
its price abruptly, too, to avoid excessive switching of old consumers to the entrant.
Investment decisions
Figure 9 illustrates the investment decisions of both rms subject to the access fee for low
and intermediate investment costs. The investment of both rms increase with the access fee,
i.e. 
E and 
I decrease. Though, the eect of the access fee on the incumbent's investment is
not too big compared to the eect on the investment decision of the entrant. The comparison
of both gures shows that higher investment costs yield lower investments by both rms and
later investment by the entrant, i.e. an higher access fee is necessary to induce facility-based
competition. Furthermore, if the access fee is suciently high to induce investment, the ratio
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I), decreases with the investment costs.
(a) Low investment costs
(F = 10 000)
(b) Intermediate investment costs
(F = 30 000)
Figure 9: Equilibrium investment decisions subject to the access fee
(for  = 100,  = 1,  = 100, and ! = 40)
For high investment costs F > ^ FE, illustrated in Figure 10, the entrant's optimal investment
decision subject to the access fee has a discontinuity at  and the entrant's initial investment
covers all regions with density greater than ^ 
E. Moreover, the incumbent's investment decision
is also discontinuous at this point and total coverage not only increases further but the eect
of the access fee becomes stronger. Intuitively, as the prices jump down and therefore a lot of
unattached consumers start buying broadband access from the entrant, the incumbent's prot
in last covered region increases due to the additional access sold to the entrant. The region
down to which the entrant initially invests ^ 
E decreases with increasing investment costs. Even
though a very high access fee is necessary to initially induce investment, the amount of regions
with initial facility-based competition increases.
Figure 10: Equilibrium investment decisions for high investment costs
(for  = 100,  = 1,  = 100, ! = 40, and F = 50 000)
Another result which becomes clear from these illustrations is that the entrant will never
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invest in all covered regions. This result does not dier from the ndings in other models with
economies of density, e.g. Faulhaber & Hogendorn (2000), Valletti et al. (2002) or G otz (2009),
and corresponds with situations observable in many European broadband access markets.
Remember that there exists a major dierence to these models regarding the competition
in the gray areas, the covered regions in which the entrant does not invest. In this setup,
the incumbent faces service-based competition in these regions due to an access obligation
and is not able to act as a monopoly. The prot of the incumbent in the last covered region
is not signicantly aected even if the entrant starts to invest because the entrant does not
invest in all regions. There are two explanations for this \irrelevance" of entrant's investment
on incumbent's investment. First, if the entrant starts to invest and lowers its price, the
incumbent becomes more aggressive and decreases its price, too. As the incumbent's demand
of old consumers is not subject to prices in an absolute manner but the price dierence, the
incumbent's demand stays nearly stable. Second, if the entrant invests and is able to lower
its prices, demand of new consumers increases and the entrant purchases more access in the
last covered region from the incumbent. Hence, the incumbent realizes additional prots from
selling access to the entrant.
Figure 11: Equilibrium investment decisions subject to the access fee with dierent switching costs
(for  = 100,  = 1,  = 100, F = 10 000, and ! = f10;40g)
The eect of the consumer switching costs on investment is positive. As illustrated in Figure
11 higher maximum switching costs, represented by the solid lines, yield higher investment
of the incumbent and lower access fees to induce investment by the entrant. This eect on
incumbent's investment is straightforward as higher switching costs weaken competition and
yield higher equilibrium prices. Hence, the incumbent realizes higher prots in each region and
the density of the last covered region 
I with zero prots decreases. The eect of the switching
costs on incumbent's investment decision decreases with increasing access fees. As long as the
access fees are low, the incumbent invests more whereas the optimal coverage is not signicantly
aected for high access fees.
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Demand
Figure 12a illustrates the equilibrium demands of both rms. Although the demand of the en-
trant is signicantly inuenced by the access fee, the eect on incumbent's demand is negligible.
The incumbent's equilibrium price yields an almost constant demand of its old consumers and
total demand is slightly increasing because more regions are covered.
(a) Total demand of both rms (b) Entrant's demand
Figure 12: Equilibrium demand subject to the access fee
(for  = 100,  = 1,  = 100, ! = 40, and F = 30 000)
Figure 12b illustrates the two types of the entrant's demand, i.e. switching consumers and
unattached consumers. As long as the entrant does not invest, the demand of switching con-
sumers increases with the access fee as the price dierence increases slightly. If the entrant
invests, the price dierence between both rms decreases and therefore demand of this con-
sumer group decreases, too. As the prices are increasing with the access fee, the demand of new
consumers decreases as long as the entrant does not invest and increases if the entrant invests.
The demand of new consumers exceeds the demand of switching consumers and, therefore, the
eect of entrant's investment on its total demand is positive.
The increase of total demand due to the attraction of new consumers could be seen as a
justication of access regulation. Given a case in which the entrant only attracts switching
consumers, the competitive eect of access regulation is negligible.25 In the context of the
\ladder of investment", we might interpret this nding as follows: As the entrant's incentives
to build own infrastructure facilities is mainly driven by the prots based on the additional
demand of unattached consumers, the objective of \establishing" entrants in the market is - in
our setup - at least questionable.
25Cf. Bishop & Walker (2002, p.243).
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Prots
The eect of the access fee on the rms' prots is illustrated in Figure 13. The entrant's prot
is maximized for costless access to incumbent's infrastructure whereas the incumbent's prot
is maximized for an access fee which yields indierence between buying access and investment
for the entrant.
(a) Low investment costs
(F = 10 000)
(b) Intermediate investment costs
(F = 30 000)
Figure 13: Equilibrium prots subject to the access fee (for  = 100,  = 1,  = 100, ! = 40)
Both ndings are straightforward. The entrant's prot decreases with the access fee due to
its increasing marginal costs in regions without own infrastructures. If the entrant invests, the
slope at which its prot decreases is lowered as this allows the entrant to realize cost savings,
i.e. to realize marginal costs equal zero in regions with in own infrastructures. Even though
the earnings per consumer decrease due to the ercer retail competition, the entrant's demand
of unattached consumers increases and therefore prots decrease at a lower rate. The prots of
the incumbent increases with the access fee as long as the entrant does not invest and decreases
with access fees above . This is intuitive because higher access fees increase the incumbent's
prot from selling access in all regions as long as the entrant does not invest. If the entrant
starts to invest, the incumbent's prot decreases due to the lower prices and due to the lost
revenues from selling access in the regions with facility-based competition.
The higher the investment costs, the lower the initial prot of the incumbent due to the
higher costs of providing the infrastructure and the resulting lower coverage and total demand.
The magnitude of the investment costs does not alter the entrant's prot as long as both rms
compete via service-based competition but increases the access fee  which triggers investment.
Hence, as the entrant prefers service-based entry for higher access fees, the entrant's prot
decreases further and the incumbent's prot maximum increases.
The obtained results oer two implications for access regulation and deregulation. First,
from the prot functions it becomes obvious why entrants argue against higher access fees.
The argumentation that in order to enter the market, entrants have to establish in the market
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and to ensure cost coverage with an installed consumer base is not conrmed in our setup.
The entrant's prots are non-negative, even if we allow for higher investment costs of the
entrant relative to the incumbent's investment costs. Second, the possibility of negotiated
access does probably yield an inferior solution. Given the optimal access fee for the entrant
and the incumbent, the result will be between zero and  and therefore in a range for which
the entrant does not invest. If the negotiated access fee is close to  prices are higher and total
coverage lower compared to a situation with partial facility-based competition. These results
are somehow in line with the ndings of Bourreau & Do gan (2004, 2005), who showed that
an incumbent might provide attractive access conditions to delay entrant's investments and to
avoid facility-based competition. Hence, it might be superior to implement access regulation
with a high access fee as this might yield lower retail prices and higher coverage. Thereby, a
price-cap regulation might be insucient to ensure facility-based competition. As a side note,
given this results entrants as well as incumbents might argue against higher access fees.
A note on cost-based access fees
Figure 14 illustrates the average costs of both rms. This provides a reference point for the
access fee and enlighten two aspects. First, a cost-based access fee  = ACI always yields pure
service-based competition. Second, an access fee above costs might yield a superior outcome
due to the facility-based entry and the ercer retail price competition. Hence, the promotion of
facility-based competition with higher access fees might yield a welfare enhancing outcome. This
insight conrms the ndings of other papers, e.g. Sarmento & Brand~ ao (2007), that cost-based
access fees, like the forward looking long-run incremental costs, yield inferior results regarding
the investment incentives. note that the necessary access fee for an outcome with facility-based
competition might be very high in our model. In our simulations an access fee approximately
more than twice the average costs of the incumbent is necessary to trigger investment by the
entrant.
(a) Low investment costs
(F = 10 000)
(b) Intermediate investment costs
(F = 30 000)
Figure 14: Average costs subject to the access fee (for  = 100,  = 1,  = 100, ! = 40)
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Both illustrations show that the initial investment of the entrant is determined by its average
costs. As long as the entrant does not invest and only enters via service-based competition, its
average costs equal the access fee, i.e. its marginal costs. If the entrant starts to invest, the
average costs include the access fee in regions without investment as well the investment costs in
regions with own infrastructure facilities. Moreover, the average costs include the competition
eect of investment as entrant's demand increases due to the lower prices.
The incumbent's average costs increase with the access fee as prices and coverage increase.
If the entrant starts to invest and provides access via its own infrastructure in some regions,
the incumbent loses consumers in these regions completely. Thus, the incumbent's average
costs increases more steep as soon as the entrant enters facility-based competition in the dense
regions.
5 Extensions
In this last section, we want to discuss two extensions of the model and the robustness of
our results. First, we will discuss the eects of geographically dierentiated prices and the
dierences to uniform pricing. Second, we will discuss a setup with a lower share of unattached
consumers by relaxing the assumption of a myopic monopolist in the previous period. Allowing
for a lower price of the incumbent in the previous period yields a situation with a greater
installed base with partially locked-in consumers and less consumers without switching costs.
5.1 Geographically dierentiated prices
In contrast to the closely related models of Valletti et al. (2002) and G otz (2009), we did not
take the opportunity of geographically dierentiated prices into account. Allowing for such a
price policy reveals that the incentives to implement such a pricing regime dier signicantly
from those in the above mentioned models. In the model of Valletti et al. (2002) as well
as in the model of G otz (2009), the incumbent has an incentive to charge dierent prices
due to its monopoly position in the less densely populated regions in which the entrant does
not invest. In our model, the incumbent has no incentive to charge dierent retail prices
at rst as there is competition in all covered regions based on an access obligation. Let us
now assume that the regulatory authority permits geographical price dierentiation. If the
incumbent increases its price in regions with only service-based competition, consumers would
switch to the entrant and the incumbent would earn less per consumer as long as its price
is above the access fee. Hence, a price dierentiation would only be prot increasing if its
equilibrium price is below the access fee.26 In our setup, it is the entrant who has the initial
26Even if the entrant has an obligation to provide services if the access fee is above equilibrium prices, it is
questionable that the regulatory authority would raise the access fee that high, especially if we consider
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incentive to provide geographically dierentiated prices. Subject to the kind of competition,
i.e. service- or facility-based competition, the entrant faces dierent costs and might therefore
increase its prots if it sets the prices accordingly. Hence, the incumbent has an incentive for
geographically dierentiated prices as reaction to the entrant's pricing behavior.
To analyze the outcome of this pricing regime, we adjust the prot functions of the rms
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Dierentiating the prot functions with respect to prices and solving the rst order conditions













which are only subject to exogenously given parameters, i.e. to the reservation utility parame-
ters  and  and to the maximum switching costs !.



















and include an additional term which reects the entrant's additional marginal costs, i.e. the
access fee . These equilibrium prices equal the equilibrium prices in our benchmark case
without investments of the entrant, i.e. Equation (6) and (7). The equilibrium prices in
regions with service-based competition are strictly increasing with the access fee and the same
characteristics as in the benchmark case apply. The extent of facility-based competition has no
eect on equilibrium prices in the dierent regions at all and consequently investment of the
entrant does not yield ercer retail competition anymore.
At the investment stage, the rms maximize their investment levels as in the original model
given the equilibrium prices of the subsequent pricing stage. Dierentiating the reduced prots
with respect to the investments and solving the rst order conditions of both rms yield the
likely complaints about a margin squeeze.
37Bender & G otz Coexistence of Service- and Facility-Based Competition












!((2 + 1) + 4!)2 + 2((! + (9 + 32! + 32!2))   ( + 2!)(9 + 16!))
: (28)
Figure 15 illustrates the investment decisions of both rms with geographically dierentiated
prices and uniform pricing. Both investment decisions yield qualitatively similar results as
before but dier quantitatively.
Figure 15: Equilibrium investment decisions subject to the access fee
(for  = 100,  = 1,  = 100, F = 30 000, and ! = 40)
Compared to the case with uniform pricing, the incumbent invests less if facility-based entry
occurs. The intuition of this result is straightforward: In regions with service-based competition,
the equilibrium price of the entrant is strictly increasing with the access fee. As a consequence,
the incumbent's prot in the last covered regions does not increase as the positive eect of
increasing prices on the revenues per consumer is compensated by the negative eect on demand.
The entrant's optimal investment diers from the original result in two ways. First, the
entrant starts to invest earlier, i.e. for a lower access fee DP < UP. The incentive to invest is
higher as investment only lowers costs without any eect on competition in regions without own
infrastructures. Consequently, the initial investment is not delayed due to the strategic eect
and the entrant invests for lower access fees. Second, the entrant invests less for high access
fees compared to the case with uniform pricing. With dierentiated prices, the entrant always
realizes a (constant) positive mark-up on the access fee. In the case with uniform pricing, the
entrant's revenue per consumer decreases with increasing access fees as the prices decrease with
the investment.27 Hence, there is a stronger incentive to invest in order to avoid the access fee.
27In some cases, the revenue per consumer might even become negative.
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To summarize, if we allow for geographically dierentiated prices in our setup, the incentives
to provide such a price regime are reversed in comparison to related models of Valletti et al.
(2002) and G otz (2009), i.e. the entrant gives the impetus for dierentiated equilibrium prices.
In this setup, prices are independent from the access fee in regions with facility-based compe-
tition and strictly increasing with the access fee in regions with service-based competition. As
the investments of both rms are positively related with the access fee, the typical trade-o
between static and dynamic eciency applies, i.e. there might be higher investment with higher
prices or lower retail prices with lower coverage and less facility-based competition. Total cov-
erage decreases compared to a uniform pricing regime. This result is based on the entrant's
lower demand for access in the last covered region as the extent of facility-based competition
has no eect on the prices in regions with service-based competition.
5.2 Forward-looking incumbent in the previous period
So far, we assumed a myopic monopolist in the previous period and an equal share of partially
locked-in and unattached consumers. In our setup, a main driver of the incumbent's increasing
incentives to invest despite - or because of - the intensied retail competition is the entrant's
increasing demand from unattached consumers in the last covered region. This positive in-
vestment eect might be lowered or possibly disappear if the share of unattached consumers
decreases, i.e. if we lower the incumbent's price in the previous period. As the investment stage
does not provide a closed-form solution of the investment decisions, it is not possible to solve
the game for the previous period analytically and to derive the prot maximizing price p
I0.
Nevertheless, simulating the equilibrium outcome for prices in the previous period below the
monopoly price, i.e. for pI0 < 
2, gives some insights regarding the robustness of our results.
Lowering the share of unattached consumer by setting a lower price pI0 yields lower equilib-
rium prices of both rms in average. This is straightforward as the entrant has to set a lower
price in order to get a positive demand. Consequently, the incumbent has to react and sets a
lower price, too, to avoid the switch of too many of its consumers.
At the investment stage, the entrant's investment incentives are weakened and facility-based
entry is delayed. The positive eect of ercer retail competition occurs later, i.e for higher .
The incumbent's optimal investment increases if the price in the previous period and the share
of unattached consumers is lowered. This is intuitive as the incumbent's installed base with
consumers who are partially locked-in due to switching costs is greater. Hence, the region with
zero prots is characterized by a lower density for a given access fee. If the share is of unattached
consumers without switching costs is suciently low, i.f. if the price of the previous period pI0
is below some threshold, the investment decision of the entrant becomes discontinuous. This
situation is comparable to the situation with high investment costs FE > ^ FE as discussed above.
The entrant's rst order condition becomes zero for high access fees only and the entrant's initial
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investment covers a range of regions.
If we compare total prots of both rms with lower initial prices pI0, we observe that the
prots of the incumbent increase with a decreasing price pI0 while the prots of the entrant
decrease. Subject to the access fee , this might lead to a situation in which the investment
inducing access fee is too high, i.e. the entrant's access costs are so high, that the entrant realizes
negative prots. Hence, if the share of unattached consumers is very low, the entrant will not
invest anymore or might even be foreclosed. This nding is in line with the standard results in
models with switching costs.28 There is an incentive to lower the price in the previous period
in order to weaken competition in subsequent periods. In our model, there is no competition
in the previous period and the incumbent might weaken future competition to an extent that
entry, at least in facility-based competition, is impeded.
To summarize, as long as the share of unattached consumers without switching costs, i.e.
the initial price pI0, is not too low, the results do not change qualitatively. If the installed base
and the amount of consumers with switching costs is relatively great, the entrant is not able to
invest and only service-based competition is realized.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that an entrant who faces a make-or-buy decision in regions with
dierent population densities might invest in own infrastructure facilities, at least in densely
populated areas. The decision between investment and reselling is determined by possible cost
savings and by the { strategic { eect of investments on competition and prices. On the one
hand, the entrant has an incentive to invest because investment lowers costs in regions with
own facilities. This allows the entrant to lower its price in order to attract more consumers, in
particular an increasing demand from unattached consumers. On the other hand, investments
yield lower equilibrium retail prices in all covered regions. If the entrant lowers its price, the
incumbent becomes more aggressive to avoid the loss of too much of its previous consumers.
Hence, the entrant faces a dilemma due to the opposite eects of investment on its prots.
This trade-o provides a possible explanation why entrants do not climb the ladder of in-
vestment, especially in the presence of cost-based access pricing. In our simulations, the access
fee inducing investment is at least twice the average costs of the incumbent. We showed that
the access fee which yields lower prices compared to the situation with a cost-based access fee
is above the average costs. Therefore, high non-cost-based, access fees might yield a welfare
enhancing outcome by fostering the investments of entrant and increasing intensity of compe-
tition. The latter point explains why the entrant and even the incumbent might argue against
such a policy. The prots of the rms decrease with (partial) facility-based competition whereas
28Cf. Klemperer (1987).
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consumers benets due to lower retail prices. Hence, the eect on total surplus appears to be
ambiguous and a detailed welfare analysis is a topic for further research.
Given a suciently high access fee and induced facility-based entry, competition on the retail
market is spurred. Thereby, the usual trade-o between static and dynamic eciency, i.e. higher
retail prices with lower penetration and higher coverage versus lower retail prices with higher
penetration and lower coverage, does not apply. As long as the entrant provides broadband
access via the network of the incumbent in regions without own infrastructures, the eect
of ercer retail competition, decreasing retail prices and increasing demand from unattached
consumers dominates the negative eect of more intense competition on investments. Hence,
the investment incentives of the incumbent increase even though or, to be more precise, because
retail competition becomes ercer.
Another feature of our model is the inclusion of consumer switching costs. We provide a
possible explanation for lower prices of entrants in broadband access markets even if they
resell the incumbent's access product, e.g. via bit stream access. The eect of switching costs
on prices and coverage includes the expected trade-o between static and dynamic eciency:
Higher maximum switching costs weaken competition, yield higher retail prices and increases
investment incentives of both rms. In contrast to many other models with consumer switching
costs, total demand is not xed but increases with more intense retail competition. A more
detailed analysis of the eect of previous customers on the equilibrium outcome might be
another topic for further research.
In our model, the entrant only competes via facility-based competition if the investment costs
are not too high. Given the magnitude of investments in Next Generation Access Networks,
it might be interesting to provide an extension of our model which allows for an analysis of
currently debated interventions, for instance a setup in which the entrant and the incumbent
cooperate, i.e. jointly invest in some regions, or a setup which includes subsidization.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 2
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A.2 Proof of proposition 4
The rst order condition of entrant's reduced prot function is given by
@E
@E
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Solving the rst order condition (A.1) for the investment costs, yields
FE = 4E!
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In the lower limit where the entrant will invest in all covered regions, i.e. E = I, the rst
order condition becomes zero if the investment costs equal
FE = 4(4   1)I!
 + 2!
(3 + 8!)2
For lower investment costs, the entrant would like to invest in more regions than the incumbent.
Given our assumption E > I, this is not possible. For higher investment costs, the rst order
condition is only satiesed for E > I. Hence, an optimal investment decision 
E  I exists
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for FE  0.
In the upper limit where the entrant is indierent between investment and only service-based
entry in region , there might exist multiple solutions satisfying the rst order condition due
to the polynomial of degree three,. Hence, we have to take the second order condition into














  4(4   1)!
!
 + 2!
(3 + 8!)2 (A.3)
As the rst order condition becomes convex for high , the rst order condition is tangent
to zero in the limit and the second order condition equals zero. Thus, to maximize entrant's
prots, the second order condition has to be strictly non-positive. As the last term is strictly









  4(4   1)!  0 (A.4)











The corner solution for which the entrant is indierent between investment and reselling in
region  is optimal if the rst order condition is zero and the second order condition is negative
at the point E = . Substituting in equation (A.2) and (A.5) yields two conditions. For low








I) , the entrant is indierent between investment and reselling in
region  for investment costs
FE = 4!((4   1)   4)
 + 2!
(3 + 8!)2 (A.6)
For lower investment costs, the rst order condition only holds if the entrant invests, i.e. E < .
Hence, an optimal investment decision 
E   exists for FE  4!((4   1)   4) +2!
(3+8!)2.








I) , the second order condition becomes positive at
E = . This implies that it is never optimal for the entrant not to invest as long as the
investment costs are not too high, i.e. investment costs less or equal (A.2). Above condition
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3 < 0 this constraint is not binding. Moreover, for high investment
costs, the rst order condition becomes positive at E = . Hence, it is never optimal to resell























To summarize, for high investment costs FE > 4!(3   4) +2!
(3+8!)2, the entrant will (i)
only invest if the access fees is suciently high and (ii) initial investment takes place in all










3 < . Note that the entrant's op-
















































(3 + 8!)2; (A.8)
i.e. the investment costs for which the rst order condition becomes zero at minimum. For
higher investment costs, the rst order condition is strictly positive and the entrant will always
choose to resell as long as prots are non-negative.








I) in equation (A.6) to obtain the maximum
investment costs for which initial investment in region  might be optimal, i.e.













(3 + 8!)2 (A.9)
Thus, the optimal investment decision of the entrant 
E satisfying the rst order condition
(A.1) and maximizing entrant's prots, i.e. ensuring a negative second order condition, exists.
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Subject to the access fee, an interior solution might exist for investment costs 4(4  
1)I! +2!
(3+8!)2 < FE < F max
E for which the entrant invests in dense regions and buys ac-

















3 ] for ^ FE < FE  F max
E
For investment costs above the maximum switching costs or low access fees, the entrant choose
the corner solutions, i.e. pure reselling. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
The rst order condition of entrant's reduced prot function is given by
@E
@E
= FE   4E!
 











! = 0 (A.10)
and the simplied investment decision with only consideration of costs by
FE
yE(p;)
=  , 2FE   E
 



























(3 + 8!)2 (A.12)
If both approaches, i.e. the rst order condition and the simplied decision yield the same
investment level, above equation (A.12) has to equal zero. Beside the trivial case with  = 0,










Substituting ~  in our initial equations (A.10) and (A.11) yields for both FE = 0. Hence,
for positive and identical investment costs, both conditions are never satised for the same
investment level E.
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which is positive for all access fees 0 <  < ~ . Therefore, both conditions are only satised for
the same investment level E if the investment costs are lower in the case with consideration
of the price eect. If the investment costs are the same in both cases, the optimal investment
level E has to be greater to satisfy the rst order condition, i.e. investment is lower. Hence,
the investment incentives are lower in the case with consideration of the price eect and con-
sequently the entrant will invest less compared to the case in which the investment decision is
only based on costs. 
A.4 Proof of proposition 8 (i)
Let us assume that the entrant will invest in all regions covered by the incumbent. Substituting






!((2 + 1) + 4!)2
2(3 + 8!)2 + 




and solving for the access fee
 =
FI(3 + 8!)2
I(! + (9 + 32! + 32!2))
 
!(3 + 4!)2
2(! + (9 + 32! + 32!2))
(A.14)
The rst order condition of the entrant for 
E = I is given by
@E
@E
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Substituting the access fee from equation (A.14) yields
@E
@E
= FE   4(4   1)I!

FI(3 + 8!)2
I(! + (9 + 32! + 32!2))
 
!(3 + 4!)2
2(! + (9 + 32! + 32!2))

 + 2!
(3 + 8!)2 = 0 (A.15)
Solving for the last region covered by both rms I leads to
I =
(3 + 8!)2 (4(4   1)FI!( + 2!)   FE(! + (9 + 32! + 32!2)))
2(4   1)!2( + 2!)((2 + 1) + 4!)2 (A.16)
Hence, both rst order conditions might be zero if both rms choose this region I which is
only non-negative if
4(4   1)FI!( + 2!)   FE(! + (9 + 32! + 32!
2))  0
On the opposite, if the dierence between both investment costs is suciently low, i.e. both
investment costs are suciently correlated, i.e.
FE > FI
4(4   1)!( + 2!)
! + (9 + 32! + 32!2)
with 0 <
4(4 1)!(+2!)
!+(9+32!+32!2)  1, the optimal region I = E as dened in equation (A.16) is
negative and consequently no feasible solution exists. Hence, for sucient correlated investment
costs, there exists no access fee  which yields to an optimal investment decision 
E = 
I. 
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